The Daily DAWN, January 17, 1999
IN his extraordinary proxy letter to the supreme court the prime minister
talked of normal legal
processes being hazardous and inadequate for abnormal times. That was meant
to be an argument for
departure from those normal legal processes. But before that is conceded
there are doubts to be
cleared.
If the times are all fouled up the question is why not address the factors
responsible for it rather than
take the distortion even further and screw up the legal processes as well?
If one abnormality is to be
met with another, human experience is, that process never stops. Or it
does when it crashes against a
vast accumulation of abnormalities.
Unfortunately the abnormality of the present times that the prime minister
now acknowledges is largely
his own and his government's creation. He launched on it almost from the
beginning. He seemed to have
started with the resolve to handle things more purposefully this time round
to do it in ways to make this
tenure of his as safe for himself and as subject to his will as possible.
Considering how the earlier
governments had ended up and how he himself had behaved in the opposition,
the resolve cannot be
much faulted. But there was a bit of an overkill.
He touched almost nothing that he didn't queer up in its consequences to
himself and his times. Whether
it was the judiciary or the parliament, his relations with his political
allies of his key appointments in the
hierarchy, his comprehension of the federal sensitivities or his view of
the place of the senate, his dealing
with the opposition or his tactics in relation to the sources of tendencies
like fundamentalism, jingoism
and intolerance - rarely was he playing by the rules or tradition or requirements
of longer-term good
sense much of a scruple. Things then had to begin coming home to roost.
The prime minister once boasted that whoever came into conflict with him
got defeated. Perhaps yes,
touch wood. But it is this desire above all others, to be always a victor
and on his own terms, that has
caused his times to become so wonky. He will not help matters now by persisting
in that attitude. And
even his luck can run out.
There wasn't much wrong with his party; PML, making common cause with MQM
at the start in Sindh.
That was the only way to outflank PPP. And that's how the game of politics
is played. But when one
has to shift from being an agitational opposition with a single-point agenda
to governing a province, one
has to try and learn to see beyond one's nose. More so against a background
like Karachi's.
Peace in Karachi had to be the principal element of the compact with MQM
whatever it took. MQM
would have needed power to go with the responsibility. That had to be conceded.
It was inherent in the
logic of its numbers too. But Mian Nawaz Sharif, ever wanting to win on
his own terms, was ready to
promise almost whatever that party asked (and mostly in IOUs) but not power.
To this day he absurdly
claims that he sacrificed his own party's government to impose governor's
rule. He cannot see that it
was just because of this insistence on his party's holding all the levers
that the province had eventually to
be brought under governor rule. That was only how he could continue to
rule over it from Islamabad.
It is no argument that MQM could not be trusted with power even in partnership
considering its
reputation of involvement in terrorism. It should not then have been wooed
in the first place. You could
not have it both ways, stultify the party and yet use it. Mian Nawaz Sharif
in short again tried to lay
down his own rules. He couldn't succeed. That was one opportunity lost,
one possibility of normality
scuppered.
From one abnormality to another. Not all the legal brains in the government
could see (or, more likely,
had the courage to say) that it was one thing to call the military to the
aid of the civilian authority but
quite another to have it set up courts to try civilians and sentence them.
When the supreme court pointed
out to the attorney general the other day that there were earlier judgments
against the setting up of a
parallel judiciary the latter tartly remarked that these military courts
were only temporary. A temporary
breach of rules apparently in the gentleman's view wasn't breach of rules.
Not even if the temporariness
could hand out to people something as permanent as death. Then, how temporary
is temporary?
Similarly, when the court asked about the justification of the official
notification suspending the powers
of the Sindh assembly's speaker and deputy speaker, the country's principal
law officer explained that
the assembly's meeting could have created problems for the government.
In other words, the laws and
the constitution of the land were of secondary importance, what suited
the government was what
mattered.
There is another current example from outside Sindh of how lightly this
government takes departures
from norms and normality. This relates to its decision to call a joint
session of the parliament just
because it did not have a majority in the senate and it feared that the
ehtesab ordinance that it was keen
on would not get past that house.
It didn't matter to it that the tactic was a brazen violation of the letter
and spirit of the constitution. As
everywhere else in a bicameral system, a legislation has to be passed by
both the houses to become law.
The provision of a joint session is made only to cater for a situation
where a bill passed by one house is
either amended by the other or is delayed for more than a specified period
of time. A delay caused by
the deliberate default of the government is of course not a delay by the
volition of the house and cannot
very obviously attract the special provision of the joint session.
Yet the government ignored all the protests and the pleas on behalf of
constitutional propriety just in
order to bypass the test of the independent will of the senate. It could
do so because it had the
advantage of a majority in a joint session. it did not matter to it that
it was thus striking a blow at the
principle of bicameralism and federalism and that it was setting a pernicious
precedent for the future.
But back in Sindh, the government has landed itself in quite a snafu there,
though it doesn't sufficiently
realise this. The court has restored the assembly's right to meet and pass
legislation. It cannot pass
resolutions, but it can make legislations serve just that purpose. The
federal parliament can of course,
because of the state of emergency in the country and governor rule in the
province, countermand the
provincial legislation with a superseding legislation of its own but the
provincial move will nevertheless
have served the assembly's purpose to the extent that any resolution would.
There may indeed ensue a
war of legislations between Islamabad and Karachi, but with Islamabad perhaps
always needing a joint
parliamentary session at 90-day intervals.
If the supreme court finds the military courts permissible, that too is
unlikely in the longer term to serve
the government's purpose. The hanging spree may indeed have brought some
peace, but that in all
probability is because the real terrorists have seen wisdom in lying low
for the time it lasts. And it cannot
last indefinitely, even though one doesn't have to take the attorney general's
word for it. The military
itself cannot feel happy at being put to use as a hangman. On a country-wide
basis too, if the interior
minister has his way. That cannot do the military's image much good. It
also has its own responsibilities.
The terrorists look almost certain to resurface in their own good time
if other methods are not adopted to
tackle them.
Those other methods are of course the normal processes that the prime minister
considers inadequate
and hazardous. First, the criticism of it may be all right but the country's
judiciary should also be helped
to strengthen and reform itself. Some of the ways of doing this was suggested
by the Law Commission
about two years ago. Failures of the courts are in large part failures
of the investigation machinery. Also,
if the judges have been reluctant to hear cases of terrorists, as the prime
minister has complained, this
obviously has something to do with the law-and-order machinery's inability
to provide them necessary
security. A Riaz Basra can bolt from police custody, and later several
of his companions can break the
Dera Ghazi Khan jail, with impunity and nothing can be done then or afterwards.
A government that
admits its inability ever to keep criminals safely locked up and thus feels
obliged to hand over the
responsibility of terrorists to the military puts its title to rule in
serious doubt.
Secondly, it is commonplace that terrorism in the country is not just a
law-and-order issue. It has political
and theocratic dimensions. This has to be tackled politically. It requires
a combination of flexibility and
firmness. Representative elements have to be negotiated with and unrepresentative
ones isolated. This
needs skills and a will that the prime minister has unfortunately shown
neither much capability nor
passion for. He cannot here insist on winning on his own terms.
The times may not be normal, but they can be best put to right by known
normal methods, with perhaps
a measure or two of added seriousness. The courts in the past did great
disservice to the cause of
democratic governance in the country by making a so-called law of necessity
the adoptable mother of
every would-be despot's illegitimate ambitions, expediency or self-made
crises. That tendency dies hard.
It has to be squashed. No departures from the norm from the laws and the
constitution should be
permitted on the grounds of emergency or abnormality or extraordinary circumstances.
Only when that
happens will rulers in this country begin to get out of the habit of ruling
by adhoc measures and pleading
inadequacy of normal processes.